Merge pull request from GHSA-xqhj-fmc7-f8mv
ecdsautils: verify: fix signature verification (CVE-2022-24884)
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LICENSE
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LICENSE
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The code of Project Gluon may be distributed under the following terms, unless
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noted otherwise in individual files or subtrees.
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Copyright (c) 2013-2021, Project Gluon
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Copyright (c) 2013-2022, Project Gluon
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All rights reserved.
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Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ the future development of Gluon.
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Please refrain from using the `master` branch for anything else but development purposes!
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Use the most recent release instead. You can list all releases by running `git tag`
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and switch to one by running `git checkout v2021.1.1 && make update`.
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and switch to one by running `git checkout v2021.1.2 && make update`.
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If you're using the autoupdater, do not autoupdate nodes with anything but releases.
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If you upgrade using random master commits the nodes *will break* eventually.
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@ -20,11 +20,11 @@
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# -- Project information -----------------------------------------------------
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project = 'Gluon'
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copyright = '2015-2021, Project Gluon'
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copyright = '2015-2022, Project Gluon'
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author = 'Project Gluon'
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# The short X.Y version
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version = '2021.1.1'
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version = '2021.1.2'
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# The full version, including alpha/beta/rc tags
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release = version
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@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
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Gluon 2021.1.2 (unreleased)
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===========================
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Gluon 2021.1.2
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==============
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Important notes
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---------------
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This release fixes a **critical security vulnerability** in Gluon's
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autoupdater.
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Upgrades to v2021.1 and later releases are only supported from releases v2018.2
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and later. Migration code for upgrades from older versions has been removed to
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simplify maintenance.
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@ -23,11 +26,30 @@ log.
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Bugfixes
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--------
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* **[SECURITY]** This release will fix a critical security vulnerability
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* **[SECURITY]** Autoupdater: Fix signature verification
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This bugfix has not been pushed to the public Gluon repository yet to avoid
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disclosing information on the issue. A detailed advisory will be published at
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the same time as the Gluon release.
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A recently discovered issue (CVE-2022-24884) in the *ecdsautils* package
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allows forgery of cryptographic signatures. This vulnerability can be
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exploited to create a manifest accepted by the autoupdater without knowledge
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of the signers' private keys. By intercepting nodes' connections to the update
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server, such a manifest allows to distribute malicious firmware updates.
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This is a **critical** vulnerability. All nodes with autoupdater must be
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updated. Requiring multiple signatures for an update does *not* mitigate the
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issue.
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As a temporary workaround, the issue can be mitigated on individual nodes by
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disabling the autoupdater via config mode or using the following commands::
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uci set autoupdater.settings.enabled=0
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uci commit autoupdater
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A fixed firmware should be installed manually before enabling the autoupdater
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again.
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See security advisory `GHSA-qhcg-9ffp-78pw
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<https://github.com/freifunk-gluon/ecdsautils/security/advisories/GHSA-qhcg-9ffp-78pw>`_
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for further information on this vulnerability.
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* **[SECURITY]** Config Mode: Prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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-- This is an example site configuration for Gluon v2021.1.1
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-- This is an example site configuration for Gluon v2021.1.2
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--
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-- Take a look at the documentation located at
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-- https://gluon.readthedocs.io/ for details.
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Gluon's releases are managed using `Git tags`_. If you are just getting
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started with Gluon we recommend to use the latest stable release of Gluon.
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Take a look at the `list of gluon releases`_ and notice the latest release,
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e.g. *v2021.1.1*. Always get Gluon using git and don't try to download it
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e.g. *v2021.1.2*. Always get Gluon using git and don't try to download it
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as a Zip archive as the archive will be missing version information.
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Please keep in mind that there is no "default Gluon" build; a site configuration
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@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Building the images
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-------------------
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To build Gluon, first check out the repository. Replace *RELEASE* with the
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version you'd like to checkout, e.g. *v2021.1.1*.
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version you'd like to checkout, e.g. *v2021.1.2*.
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::
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@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
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From: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
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Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 19:01:39 +0200
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Subject: ecdsautils: verify: fix signature verification (CVE-2022-24884)
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Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
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diff --git a/utils/ecdsautils/Makefile b/utils/ecdsautils/Makefile
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index 7f1c76f0301f56b0a88c1f6a1a0147397fde25c7..5ba893be69d40279cd6f5c9e544e941d0011f451 100644
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--- a/utils/ecdsautils/Makefile
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+++ b/utils/ecdsautils/Makefile
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
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PKG_NAME:=ecdsautils
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PKG_VERSION:=0.3.2.20160630
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-PKG_RELEASE:=1
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+PKG_RELEASE:=2
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PKG_REV:=07538893fb6c2a9539678c45f9dbbf1e4f222b46
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PKG_MAINTAINER:=Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
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PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.xz
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diff --git a/utils/ecdsautils/patches/0001-verify-fix-signature-verification-CVE-2022-24884.patch b/utils/ecdsautils/patches/0001-verify-fix-signature-verification-CVE-2022-24884.patch
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..34d80cc201c0e87ca654c3def4fbbbddf622b0ba
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/utils/ecdsautils/patches/0001-verify-fix-signature-verification-CVE-2022-24884.patch
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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
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+From 1d4b091abdf15ad7b2312535b5b95ad70f6dbd08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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+Message-Id: <1d4b091abdf15ad7b2312535b5b95ad70f6dbd08.1651078760.git.mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
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+From: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
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+Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 22:04:07 +0200
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+Subject: [PATCH] verify: fix signature verification (CVE-2022-24884)
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+
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+Verify that r and s are non-zero. Without these checks, an all-zero
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+signature is always considered valid.
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+
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+While it would be nicer to error out in ecdsa_verify_prepare_legacy()
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+already, that would require users of libecdsautil to check a return value
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+of the prepare step. To be safe, implement the fix in an API/ABI-compatible
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+way that doesn't need changes to the users.
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+---
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+ src/lib/ecdsa.c | 10 ++++++++++
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+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
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+
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+diff --git a/src/lib/ecdsa.c b/src/lib/ecdsa.c
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+index 8cd7722be8cd..a661b56bd7c8 100644
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+--- a/src/lib/ecdsa.c
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++++ b/src/lib/ecdsa.c
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+@@ -135,6 +135,12 @@ regenerate:
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+ void ecdsa_verify_prepare_legacy(ecdsa_verify_context_t *ctx, const ecc_int256_t *hash, const ecdsa_signature_t *signature) {
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+ ecc_int256_t w, u1, tmp;
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+
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++ if (ecc_25519_gf_is_zero(&signature->s) || ecc_25519_gf_is_zero(&signature->r)) {
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++ // Signature is invalid, mark by setting ctx->r to an invalid value
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++ memset(&ctx->r, 0, sizeof(ctx->r));
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++ return;
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++ }
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++
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+ ctx->r = signature->r;
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+
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+ ecc_25519_gf_recip(&w, &signature->s);
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+@@ -149,6 +155,10 @@ bool ecdsa_verify_legacy(const ecdsa_verify_context_t *ctx, const ecc_25519_work
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+ ecc_25519_work_t s2, work;
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+ ecc_int256_t w, tmp;
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+
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++ // Signature was detected as invalid in prepare step
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++ if (ecc_25519_gf_is_zero(&ctx->r))
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++ return false;
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++
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+ ecc_25519_scalarmult(&s2, &ctx->u2, pubkey);
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+ ecc_25519_add(&work, &ctx->s1, &s2);
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+ ecc_25519_store_xy_legacy(&w, NULL, &work);
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+--
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+2.36.0
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+
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